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The economic and political dislocation that began to engulf East Asia1 in the latter part of 
1997 may prove to be one of the defining events of the post-Cold War era. At the very 
least, it dramatically illustrated the way an increasingly internationalized and inter-linked 
global economy operates, and the impact associated flows of financial capital can have not 
just on individual nation states, but on entire regions. At another, less immediate level, the 
East Asian crisis drew renewed attention to important questions about the autonomy of 
national governments, the possibility of pursuing policies of which markets disapprove, and 
the viability of a distinctively ‘Asian way’ of managing political and economic 
relationships. In the longer term, the crisis and the attempts of institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to manage it, may presage a more enduring struggle to 
define the rules that govern the global economy – an issue of particular significance given 
the IMF’s close links with the United States and an Anglo-American agenda of market-
oriented reform.2 If recent events in East Asia had one unequivocal lesson it was that the 
process of crisis management was not simply a question of applying the ‘correct’ economic 
remedies for essentially ‘technical’ problems. On the contrary, attempts to impose a new, 
market-based order replete with more ‘transparent’ economic practices were necessarily a 
highly politicised, direct threat to established distributional coalitions and patterns of 
economic organization throughout the region. 
 
To understand why the sorts of reforms proposed by inter-governmental agencies like the 
IMF were so deeply political and potentially destabilizing, it is helpful to look at East Asia 
before the crisis. By examining the distinctive way in which capitalism developed in East 
Asia it is possible to see both why its reform was considered to be so desirable by many 
outsiders, and why it has proved so problematic. Consequently, I initially examine the East 
Asian patterns of capitalist organisation, particularly the Japanese and Chinese variants, 
before considering the styles of policymaking that characterize government-business 
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relations in much of East Asia. I illustrate the importance of these relations in the 
Malaysian case. Finally, I look at East Asia in the context of an increasingly inter-linked 
global economy. The central argument I develop here is that the crisis not only highlighted 
fundamental differences between East Asian and Anglo-American variants of capitalism, 
but presented a possibly unique opportunity for the Anglo-American nations to force the 




Capitalism in East Asia 
 
At the outset, it should be borne in mind that ‘regions’ are necessarily imprecise, arbitrarily 
defined entities. Not only is it debatable which countries ought to be considered part of 
‘East Asia’, but the very conceptualization of discrete regions suggests a homogeneity that 
is generally unwarranted. Indeed, in the case of East Asia, the putative region is 
characterized by a diversity of ethnic, political and cultural divisions that make 
generalization difficult and potentially misleading. However, there are two qualities in 
particular which help to define and demarcate the East Asian region and make such a 
broad-brush conceptualization meaningful. First, East Asia is distinguished by several 
highly distinctive forms of capitalist organization that bear little resemblance to either 
stylized Anglo-American economic theory or corporate activity in North America, Britain, 
Australia or New Zealand. In Japan, (South) Korea, and throughout the Chinese diaspora, 
there are patterns of economic organization that are deeply embedded in the societies of 
which they are a part, and which are likely to prove resistant to wholesale reform of the sort 
proposed by bodies like the IMF. Second, in the more narrowly defined arena of public 
policy, especially its economic aspects, there are enough commonalties of approach across 
the region to lend credence to the idea of a distinctively ‘Asian way’ of economic 
management. Moreover, it is a tradition of policymaking that has been reinforced by the 
regional integration of economic activity in general, and the consolidation and 
institutionalization of close relations between business and political elites throughout East 
Asia in particular.  
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Japan  has provided both the principal engine of economic integration and an influential 
model of economic development for the region as a whole. Japan pioneered a model of 
state-led economic development which not only underpinned its own remarkable 
resurrection in the aftermath of World War II, but which provided a role model for a 
number of other countries within the region. At one level Japan’s own experience has 
invited emulation as the region’s most successful economy and the only country thus far to 
have successfully challenged the economic dominance of  North America and Europe. At 
another, more fundamental  level, however,  Japan’s influence has been far more direct and 
- especially in the cases of Taiwan and Korea - is attributable to its role as a colonial 
power.3 In both Korea and Taiwan, Japanese colonialism was instrumental in centralizing 
national power structures and consolidating the role of the state in domestic economic 
development. Korea used Japan’s keiretsu system of inter-locked, diversified  industrial 
groups as the model for its own chaebols. Less obvious, but with potentially equally 
profound long-term consequences, has been the role played by Japanese trade and 
investment in the region as Japanese TNCs have expanded from their domestic base. 
 
Japanese corporations have provided one of the key forces propelling regional integration. 
Successive waves of investment and expansion have initially seen labour-intensive 
industries like textiles, and subsequently more sophisticated industries like electronics and 
car manufacturers, shift all or parts of their operations into the East Asian region in order to 
take advantage of lower production costs and access potentially important new markets. 
Two points are worth emphasizing about this process as they are central to this distinctive 
form of capitalism. First, the keiretsu structure means that Japanese companies are less 
reliant on markets to mediate or determine economic outcomes,4 especially within the 
borders of individual nation states. The relatively autonomous structure of the keiretsu 
groups, particularly their financial and marketing capacities, combined with a proclivity for 
intra-firm as opposed to intra-industry trade, mean that they enjoy a degree of insulation 
from the actions of host governments. Even more significantly – and this is the second key 
point – Japanese corporations have entrenched their position within the region by 
establishing close connections with domestic political elites. Japanese companies, often 
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with the direct assistance of the Japanese government, have spun a complex web of 
governmental and business relationships throughout the region, cementing their privileged 
position through the strategic use of aid and infrastructure packages that effectively lock 
host governments into symbiotic relationships with Japanese capital.5 Not only do such 
relationships and corporate independence militate against wholesale change, but Japanese 
corporations will remain well-connected and competitive in whatever economic order 
ultimately emerges. 
 
The highly distinctive, government-assisted strategies that underpinned the industrial 
expansion of Japanese corporations are especially significant in the context of an 
international political economy that is characterized by more than one form of capitalist 
organization. Simply put, Japanese transnational corporations have generally proved to be 
formidable competitors in an ostensibly liberal and ‘open’ international trading 
environment. Companies that originate in the Anglo-American economies, however, which 
enjoy neither the benefit of being part of an integrated cooperate network nor ‘insider’ 
status in what are still the potentially important markets of East Asia may not compete as 
successfully as the Japanese in a region which not only considers government involvement 
in economic development to be legitimate, but which makes  contingent economic 
‘distortions’ and market imperfections a  source of potential competitive advantage.6 Seen 
in this context, the East Asian crisis has provided a possibly unique window of opportunity 
for countries like the US to impose a new market order on the region which could – 
theoretically, at least – encourage the sort of competition in which American companies 
might be expected to succeed. 
 
The other major form of capitalist organization in East Asia that is unlikely to be swept 
aside by neoliberal reform is Chinese. Principally associated with the estimated 50 million 
ethnic ‘overseas Chinese’ that live outside China in East Asia, Chinese capitalism is 
centered on familial relations and complex networks of personal obligation. Whereas in 
Japan economic control and authority depend upon elaborate structures of inter-locking 
shareholdings, Chinese capitalism revolves around more informal interpersonal 
relationships (guanxi). In all the variants of Asian capitalism – Japanese, Korean and 
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Chinese – the key point to recognize is that each one is principally a socially embedded and 
institutionalized network.7 The distinctive network form, whether it is reinforced through 
personal connections or corporate structures, provides the systemic dynamism of each 
variety of capitalism in East Asia and simultaneously imparts a degree of path-dependency 
to overall economic development. In other words, capitalist organization and expansion is 
not simply reflective of an identical universal dynamic, but mediated by the social setting 
in which it is embedded. This is especially important in the case of Chinese capitalism and 
its consolidation in the region’s social and political structures. 
 
Chinese business people have achieved a disproportionately significant position in the 
region’s economic infrastructure, and not just in the more obvious areas like China itself or 
Taiwan. Throughout Southeast Asia in particular, Chinese capitalists have been central to 
the economic development of individual countries. In Indonesia, for example, although less 
than 4 per cent of the population, ethnic Chinese business people control more than 70 per 
cent of listed firms by market capitalization.8 Chinese capitalists consolidated their 
economic position by establishing close relationships with the ruling political elite in 
Indonesia, especially the Suharto family. True, this has not insulated them from Indonesia’s  
general collapse, or saved small-scale Chinese capitalists from racially motivated attacks as 
the economy collapsed. However, this does not invalidate the general point that the 
conventional ‘Western’ distinction made between the public and private sectors is a good 
deal less meaningful in Southeast Asia in particular. The significance of this institutional 




Policy-Making in East Asia 
 
The distinctive political economies of East Asia have been subjected to increased scrutiny 
in the wake of the recent economic crisis. Particular attention has been paid to regional 
policy-making practices and the close relations between government that are associated 
with them. It should be remembered, however, that until very recently even prominent 
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champions of the prevailing market–centred economic orthodoxy like the World Bank 
were prepared to concede that government ‘intervention’ in economic processes could play 
an important role in facilitating industrial development.9  Similarly, the massive inflows of 
foreign direct and portfolio investment that helped fuel East Asia’s remarkable economic 
rise were attracted to the region despite the relationships which have of late apparently 
engendered such concern in the minds of potential investors. Indeed, in the authoritarian 
regimes of Southeast Asia in particular, the cronyism and collusion that is now routinely 
depicted as the source of East Asia’s problems,10 hitherto appeared to be an integral 
component of the region’s former dynamism, stability and profitability.  
 
If it is possible to talk of an ‘Asian way’ of policy-making, once again Japan has been the 
principal role model and exemplar. Not only has what Chalmers Johnson famously 
described as Japan’s ‘developmental state’ become the prototype for a model of accelerated 
industrial development, but the close relationships between the private and public sectors 
that permitted government policy to be effectively implemented in Japan have been 
reproduced in one form or another throughout the region.11  At its most benign, cooperation 
between the public and private sectors of the type that has underpinned Japan’s remarkable 
post-war renaissance is an essential prerequisite for the effective application of various 
‘industry  policies’. Government-sponsored industry policies, in which the state attempts to 
encourage specific economic activities in pursuit of an overarching vision of national 
industrial development, have been one of the hall-marks of East Asia’s rapid 
industrialization. Until very recently there was little doubt as to the apparent effectiveness 
of such policies. Indeed, so successful have the countries of East Asia been in exporting to 
the established industrialized powers of Europe and North America, that trade disputes – 
especially between the US and the Northeast Asian giants, Japan and China – have become 
a fixture in the international trading system. Again, many of the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of Asian variants of political and economic organization are exemplified in the 
Japanese case. 
 
The close relations that exist between Japan’s corporate sector and bureaucracy have been 
central to the latter’s  ability to coordinate and direct Japan’s economic policies. Japan 
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developed a governmental infrastructure that permitted the implementation of policies 
through a range of institutionalized consultative mechanisms in which key bureaucratic, 
political and business figures coordinated their activities in pursuit of collective goals. 
Japan’s bureaucracy is famously powerful, and for a long period its ability to construct and 
implement policy in apparently selfless devotion to the national interest, provided a model 
for other regional states. However, the opaque, unaccountable nature of the policy-making 
process, and the nexus that developed between powerful political and corporate interests 
led, particularly in the construction industry, to outright corruption and the misallocation of 
public monies. Not only have a number of scandals undermined domestic public 
confidence in the hitherto unimpeachable bureaucracy, but it has made it more difficult for 
the Japanese government to resist international calls for further reform.  
 
A couple of general points are worth making here, however. First, many of Japan’s 
– and by implication the region’s problems – stem from an earlier general 
loosening of government controls and moves toward financial deregulation in 
particular. Many of the problems associated with the so-called ‘bubble economy’ 
that developed in Japan during the late 1980s flowed directly from financial sector 
liberalization. The controls over credit  allocation which had been such an integral 
part of directing the development of domestic industry were gradually relaxed in 
response to US pressure on the one hand and the growth of increasingly accessible 
international financial markets on the other.12 Second, even in the event that a 
combination of foreign pressure and the increased power of financial markets 
forces a wholesale reconfiguration of business-government relations in Japan and 
brings about more ‘transparent’ policy-making processes, this will not necessarily 
unravel  the integrated keiretsu system. Where international market pressures and 
transitional regulatory bodies have has a more immediate impact is over the 





East Asian Political Economies: The Malaysian Exemplar 
 
The smaller countries of Southeast Asia have been particularly hard hit by the crisis, and 
not just economically. For Malaysia in particular, the crisis was an especially humbling 
experience as its Prime Minister, Mahathir Bin Mohamad, played a prominent role in 
attempting to develop a critique of neoliberalism, the role of pro-market regulatory 
authorities, and the influence of ‘the West’ more generally. Malaysia also highlights  an 
important contrast between Northeast Asian state-led development and the ‘crony 
capitalism’ associated with a number of Southeast Asian countries. As such, it is an 
important exemplar of many of the issues that are central to the clash of capitalisms 
between ‘Asia’ and ‘the West’. 
 
At the outset, it is important to recognize that the Malaysian political economy is 
distinguished by a number of ethnic, political and economic relationships that make it very 
different from the general Anglo-American experience. As in the rest of East Asia, 
economic policy-making in Malaysia has had a critically important and overtly political 
dimension. Indeed, in East Asia, national sovereignty is much more closely bound-up with 
economic security than it is in North America or Western Europe.13 In East Asia  nation-
building is a comparatively recent experience and often a less completely realized project. 
Consequently, the legitimacy of ruling elites is often fragile, not endorsed by genuinely 
democratic elections, and dependent upon the ability of governments to deliver continuing 
economic growth. In such a context, threats to economic stability are potentially threats to 
the existing political order.  
 
Malaysia is a good example of the way business structures, ethnic divisions, and political 
allegiances intersect to form a distinctive, yet characteristically East Asian political 
economy. A key influence on Malaysia’s contemporary evolution has been the desire to 
promote an indigenous Bumiputera capitalist class. Although initially intended as a counter 
to the dominance of local Chinese capitalists, of late it has given way to an ethnic 
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rapprochement leavened by money.14 In short, networks of personal relationships have 
helped embed an economic order in which Chinese capitalism is a central part. These 
relationships have been further cemented by Malaysia’s political system, in which the 
ruling United Malays’ National Organization (UMNO) has used its position to centralize 
political power and create holding companies that control key areas of the economy. The 
mutually rewarding symbiosis developed by the ruling political and economic elites has 
been further entrenched as politics has become a vehicle for achieving and consolidating 
economic power, and Chinese business leaders have provided financial support for UMNO 
political leaders. 
 
Mahathir’s anti-market fulminations become more comprehensible in the context 
of a country in which political and economic interests are tightly fused. At one 
level Mahathir’s attacks on international financial markets and ‘the West’ more 
generally can be read as self-serving rhetoric designed to shift the blame for the 
crisis elsewhere.15 Clearly, there is much about this discourse and the notion of 
distinctively ‘Asian values’ that is designed to legitimize and insulate from 
criticism political and economic practices that are grossly inequitable. And yet 
Mahathir makes several points that not only have the potential to find a 
sympathetic resonance within the region, but which raise important questions 
about economic organization and management more generally. This is especially 
true in the case of Mahathir’s attempts to use currency controls to insulate the 
Malaysian economy from the destabilising impact of massive, highly liquid and 
essentially speculative flows of capital. The outcome of this experiment is likely to 
be affected by Malaysia’s domestic political crisis, but if it is only moderately 
successful it may well be copied by other regional governments that despair of 
orthodox, neoliberal remedies ever working. 
 
Many of Mahathir’s most compelling claims revolve around the threat to national policy  
autonomy posed by massive, unregulated capital flows and an international economic 
regime that facilitates them. Significantly, Mahathir’s speeches often explicitly and  
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approvingly invoke Japan as a model of state-led industrialization. Mahathir  also 
recognizes that such a developmental path will be difficult to emulate in an international 
economic order in which on the one hand markets can punish policies of which they 
disapprove, while on the other a range of agreements reached under the international 
auspices of bodies like the World Trade Organization and the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum outlaw discriminatory industry policies.16 As Mahathir amongst others 
has pointed out, the gross disparity in economic weight between countries like the US and 
smaller countries like Malaysia, and the potential benefits of scope and scale that accrue to 
multinational corporations from the early industrializing nations, means that it is very 
difficult for companies in smaller countries to compete, or for the countries themselves to 
play anything but a peripheral  role in the global economy. Even in the unlikely event that it 
were possible to establish an international ‘level-playing field’ it would advantage those 
countries – or more precisely, the companies that emanate from such countries – which are 
currently prominent in the world economy; positions which were, without exception, 
achieved with the active assistance of states.17 In other words, the ‘inherent inequity’ of the 
international liberal market order means that the economic security of late industrializing 
nations is systematically threatened and constrained by the dominance of the established 
industrial powers.18 
 
Thoroughgoing neoliberal reform therefore presents a dual threat to regional political elites. 
On the one hand calls for greater openness and transparency are necessarily a challenge to 
the close business relations that characterize regional political-economies. On the other, the 
outlawing of discriminatory trade and investment practices means that not only is the glue 
which binds such relationships together weakened, but the chances of intervening to hasten 
and direct the process of industrialization are diminished. Hardly surprising, then, that 
Mahathir has attempted to promote institutional forums that potentially reflect and 
legitimize regional, East Asian-style economic and political practices. The East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC), which Mahathir has tirelessly championed as, at the least, an 
Asian caucus within, if not an alternative to, the wider Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 






East Asia in a Global Economy 
 
If there is one thing that the crisis in East Asia unambiguously confirmed it is quite how 
integrated and inter-dependent the world economy has become. Justifiable skepticism about 
some of the more uncritical conceptualizations of ‘globalization’ notwithstanding,20 recent 
events highlight just how powerful so-called ‘contagion effects’ can be, and how quickly 
systemic shocks can be transmitted throughout regions, if not the entire world economy. In 
other words, the way the global economy is currently configured encourages the movement 
of massive, often speculative and short-term flows of capital with potentially deeply 
destabilizing effects on individual countries.21 Yet the conventional wisdom amongst 
orthodox economists is that the region’s problems stem from the opaque nature of business-
government relationships in particular and the inscrutable, unaccountable nature of East 
Asian economic practices more generally. It is worth briefly revisiting the origins of the 
crisis to gain a clearer picture of its dynamics and the key structures that continue to shape 
regional and trans-regional relations. 
 
The initial trigger for East Asia’s difficulties was a currency crisis in Thailand, which 
flowed from an ill-conceived attempt to peg, and then defend the baht’s value against the 
US dollar. The escalating crisis and the rapid, concomitant loss of investor confidence drew 
attention to the structure of the Thai political economy and the apparent importance of 
‘money-politics’ in bringing about its downfall.22 However, it should be noted that 
Thailand’s long-established political structures had not been previously proved either a 
disincentive to  international investment or a constraint on profitability. On the contrary, the 
chance of making rapid profits led to large inflows of capital which ultimately found 
expression in a speculative property bubble. As Mexico discovered to its cost several years 
ago, massive, unregulated inflows of highly liquid capital can seriously destabilize and 
distort domestic economic activity.23 While access to mobile international capital for 
domestic investment is clearly one way of promoting rapid economic development, it 
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leaves the host nation potentially vulnerable to sudden withdrawal and a range of external 
institutional and economic pressures.  
As the crisis spread outwards from East Asia it highlighted quite how inter-connected the 
world economy had become, suggesting that the crisis might have more to do with the 
contradictions of capitalism in general, rather than some uniquely East Asian problems. A 
key potential transmission mechanism of Asian contagion was what Robert Gilpin called 
the ‘Nichibei economy’, or the structural interdependence between the US and Japan.24 Not 
only was this relationship central to the well-being of the international economic system in 
general, but it had allowed both countries to pursue policies that would otherwise have 
been problematic. Japan’s access to North American markets was the cornerstone of its 
high-growth, export-oriented developmental model, while the US was able run substantial 
budget deficits, despite being the world’s largest debtor – largely thanks to the willingness 
of Japanese investors to buy US Treasury Bonds.  But as the hitherto formidably 
competitive Japanese economy sank into recession it raised questions about both the 
continuance of Japanese outflows in the face of a domestic banking crisis, and about more 
enduring and widespread problems of declining profitability and massive manufacturing 
over-capacity throughout the industrialised world.25 
 
In short,  the East Asian crisis highlighted potential systemic fault lines that tended to be 
obscured beneath the euphoria and hyperbole associated with the region’s ‘miraculous’ 
growth era and the seemingly unstoppable ascendancy of capitalism – albeit with decidedly 
East Asian characteristics. Moreover, the crisis provided a forceful reminder that while all 
countries may be affected by widespread changes in the international political economy, 
especially the growing power of financial markets, some countries were more susceptible 
to shifts in market sentiment than others. US indebtedness and past profligacy do not 
appear to have diminished its moral authority or practical input in shaping the global 
economic order. Revealingly, the impact of the crisis in East Asia stands in stark contrast to 
the United States’ own financial catastrophe – the Savings and Loan scandal of the late 
1980s - during which there was no suggestion that dismembering Anglo-American style 
capitalism might be an appropriate way of dealing with that crisis. For all the talk of an 
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‘Asian century’, therefore, the international response to the crisis suggested that the 




The intention of this chapter has not been to defend East Asian forms of capitalism, 
capitalists, or political elites. Rather, I have attempted to highlight some of the factors that 
will continue to shape political and economic outcomes in the region, and suggest that 
attempts to manage the crisis involved much more than simply the appropriateness of 
public policy choices or the possible desirability of transparent business practices. On the 
contrary, the crisis stands as a watershed in trans-regional relations, which has helped to 
consolidate not only the international rules, norms and institutional frameworks within 
which capitalism of any variety is managed, but the possible future trajectory of capitalist 
development more generally. 
 
If different forms of capitalism are to ‘converge’ on some common end-point then it will 
necessitate the removal or transformation of embedded patterns of political authority, 
business practice and social relationships more generally.26 Yet the hostility with which the 
IMF’s strictures were greeted in countries like China, and the connection that was made 
with a wider Anglo-American reform agenda,27 suggest that their ultimate impact may be 
to provide a mechanism with which to foster regional  solidarity and resistance. Much 
depends on the constellations of domestic political forces within the nations of East Asia 
and their relative influence on the overall direction of policy-making.28 The more general 
and crucial point to re-emphasize here is that, whether successfully realized or not, the 
crisis presented a possibly unique opportunity for the Anglo-American nations in general 
and the US in particular to force the East Asian nations to ‘converge’ on their own, 
possibly  less competitive form of capitalism.29  
 
Despite the apparent success of external forces in imposing neoliberal, market-oriented 
reforms on a number of countries in East Asia,  the more important and enduring questions 
raised by the crisis may be about the durability of capitalism itself in its contemporary 
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global configuration. When seen as a part of long-term global capitalist development, one 
of the most striking aspects of the East Asian crisis is the disjuncture between what might 
be broadly described as industrial or productive capital, and financial capital, something 
that has characterized earlier systemic crises of capitalism.30 What distinguishes the 
contemporary period, however, is the globalized nature of economic activity. Massive, 
potentially destabilizing flows of highly liquid financial capital are able to transmit 
systemic shocks or imbalances with unprecedented rapidity and force – a development 
from which no nation is immune. Thus, IMF attempts to enhance the influence of market 
mechanisms within East Asia may ultimately exacerbate the potentially destructive and 
destabilizing power of capital itself. In such a situation disagreements about economic 
policy threaten to assume an urgency and intensity that may  generate wider, unpredictable 
forms of inter-regional contestation. 
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